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SFShenanigans Host Christmas in August on BART

posted by Scott Beale on Tuesday, August 21st, 2007

Woodland Lights

SFShenanigans is a San Francisco based prankster group inspired by New York’s amazing Improv Everywhere. Last month SFShenanigans had a Reverse Trick-or-Treat Halloween event on BART. Their next event, “Christmas In August” takes place this Sunday, August 26th where they will be signing Christmas carols on BART.

Well, we’ve done Halloween in July, and now it’s time for Christmas in August. And what is more Christmas-y than carols? Singing carols makes the singer happy, and more importantly it makes the listener smile.

The plan is simple: We sing carols carols, in August, aboard BART trains. I’ll provide the song sheet, you provide your voice, we all have fun.

When and where shall we meet?
Sunday, August 26
2:30pm
Powell BART Station, West end of the platform.

I’ll be wearing a Santa hat for easy spotting!

Agent Wyrd

UPDATE 1: Linton Johnson, a representative from BART, has warned SFShenanigans that they will need a “free speech” permit or else BART Police will shut down the event. SFShenanigans has updated their blog stating that the event is still on.

UPDATE 2: BART representative Linton Johnson responds to the criticism regarding the “free speech” permit requirement.

UPDATE 3: SFShenanigans is reporting that “the event went off without a hitch”. A full mission report will follow.

UPDATE 4: SFShenanigans has posted their Christmas In August Debrief.

photo credit: Scott Beale

Related Posts:

- A Chaos Christmas Carol with Chicken John and friends…

- 2nd Annual TechCrunch Party at August Capital

- Bastard Christmas Party

- Christmas Coke Bombs

- Chicken John’s Christmas Show

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filed under: San Francisco

this blog post was written by Scott Beale on Tuesday, August 21st, 2007


Viewing 35 Comments

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    Hi Scott,
    I just wanted to first say that I enjoy your blog on laughingsquid.com. I noticed that on Sunday, you're encouraging folks to go to the Powell Street BART Station to take part in a Christmas in August event this Sunday at 2:30pm. Sounds fun!
    There's one problem though and that is you could face an embarrasing run-in with the BART Police. The reason is that you don't have a Free Speech Permit, which my department issues. The good news is you can easily get one, and they're free. The bad news is it's too late to get one by August 26 because you need to submit your application no less than 7 days in advance. Here's how you get an application: www.bart.gov/freespeech/.
    If you can change the date, then we'll be happy to issue you a permit, just let me know how I can help. Perhaps I might even join you!

    Thanks in advance,
    • ^
    • v
    The fact that there's such a thing as a "Free Speech Permit" pretty much bluescreens my brain.
    • ^
    • v
    My suggestion: have everyone bring a copy of the Bill of Rights. Maybe compose a carol with the text of the first amendment! Should be all the permit you'd think you'd need.
    • ^
    • v
    Bluescreen indeed.

    I read the pdf documents on the bart website about paid areas and how they're not to be used to "engage in other expressive activities." I understand the general idea (about BART as a transport system first and foremost) but I cannot disagree enough with the implementation.

    How is this free speech permit unchallenged? What is the basis in law for such a rule? Why does a government sponsored transit system somehow attain special status?

    Why would the Bill of Rights not apply on the BART?
    • ^
    • v
    The fact that this is actually called a "Free Speech permit" is more than a little bizarre. I'm not familiar with BART and their Free Speech permit process, but in the City the usual charge assessed is "unlawful assembly;" I've never heard of anyone being convicted for that infraction though.

    I don't even know what court jurisdiction BART infractions would be overseen at but I don't anticipate people being convicted for singing Christmas carols. I'm not gonna offer a prediction as to whether mass arrests would ensue but it'd certainly make for some shocking headlines.

    I can picture it now, Bill O'Reilly would decide that it's part of the war on Christmas and how the godless heathens in San Francisco are criminalizing Christmas cheer.
    • ^
    • v
    I *think* I can wrap my head around what they're trying to do with these permits... I can imagine two rival political factions demonstrating and clashing, to the detriment of those folks who are just trying to get home from work.

    Holding organizers accountable for their group's actions seems reasonable enough until you stop to think about it.

    Talking specifics, there are bits about the permit process that seem fundamentally unsuited to this sort of activity, which if you think about it translate directly to any real, fundamental free speech exercise. It's considered a violation if you do not accurately report the number of participants in your event. In specific, this is bad because such a novelty as Christmas in August is the sort of thing you just can't predict.

    Sure, if you had professional organizers who had demographics and projections and sliding scales and membership rosters, you might have good data. You would know who's coming, how many people you could effectively reach and all that good stuff that the nice people at BART ask for. Then again, that sounds more like canned speech than free speech. Pre-programmed and formulated before it's even uttered.

    Now, if you had a compelling message, the speech was flowing freely, and the discussion and membership of the group was free and spontaneous, you're not going to fit the requirements of this rule. Maybe the one or two guys who came up with an idea over a couple of bottles of port one night were on to something and 10,000 people decide to abandon their trek home from their boring job and participate in a bit of frivolity and silliness. Maybe the organizers should have put down the bottle and gone for a little fresh air.

    I'm all for the demographic peddlers having their free speech too. I'm even hip on those who might want to limit the effects of their skilled mongering on the crowds around me as I make the trip to my destination. Isn't there a better way to do that, though, than to limit what's free and unconstrained?
    • ^
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    Linton, if it's a foregone conclusion that the permit will be granted, why on Earth do you need 7 days to do it? Do you just say the word "yes" very very very slowly?
    • ^
    • v
    The BART rules and application do not define prohibited "expressive activity," but in one instance a few examples are given, and nothing comes close to caroling.

    Someone needs to challenge these things in court or the government will just take more and more rights.
    • ^
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    I humbly suggest that any persons wishing to protest the idea of a "free speech permit" take a simple action: let's flood BART's permit issuers with requests for perfectly legitimate, banal expressions of speech. For example, a request for a group of one to wear a T-shirt wishing others to have a nice day, or a group of two to have a verbal discussion about the merits of artificial sugar.
    • ^
    • v
    Greetings kmcdani@BART.gov:

    I read the comment allegedly posted by Mr. Linton Johnson, BART's Chief Spokesperson @
    http://laughingsquid.com/sfshenanigans-host-Chr..., which states:

    ==================
    Hi Scott,
    I just wanted to first say that I enjoy your blog on laughingsquid.com. I noticed that on Sunday, you’re encouraging folks to go to the Powell Street BART Station to take part in a Christmas in August event this Sunday at 2:30pm. Sounds fun!
    There’s one problem though and that is you could face an embarrasing run-in with the BART Police. The reason is that you don’t have a Free Speech Permit, which my department issues. The good news is you can easily get one, and they’re free. The bad news is it’s too late to get one by August 26 because you need to submit your application no less than 7 days in advance. Here’s how you get an application: www.bart.gov/freespeech/.
    If you can change the date, then we’ll be happy to issue you a permit, just let me know how I can help. Perhaps I might even join you!
    Thanks in advance.

    ==================

    BART's rule @ http://www.bart.gov/docs/FE_Permit_Rules.pdf to submit an application at least seven days prior to an event appears to be contrary to the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court pointed out that while the federal courts have upheld various advance notice requirements, such as 36 hours advance notice for expressive conduct at a busy bus terminal, that the courts have struck down longer periods, such as five days.

    Needless to say, while BART's police may enjoy qualified immunity in enforcing the seven day notice requirement, I would suggest that the more reasonable approach would be to allow the Christmas in August event to proceed and for BART to amend its rules within constitutionally acceptable parameters.

    This would also be consonant with Mr. Johnson's well-founded desire to avoid embarrassment, especially in front of a U.S. District Court judge in a civil rights action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

    Sincerely,

    David

    From Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006):

    b. Breadth of the Advance Notice and Permitting Requirements

    (b) We next consider whether the two-day advance notice requirement applicable to Category 3 events, those events not encompassed within Categories 1 and 2, is narrowly tailored.

    As noted by the Seventh Circuit:

    [T]he length of the required period of advance notice is critical to its reasonableness; and given that the time required to consider an application will generally be shorter the smaller the planned demonstration and that political demonstrations are often engendered by topical events, a very long period of advance notice with no exception for spontaneous demonstrations unreasonably limits free speech.

    Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts, including ours, have struck down a variety of advance notice requirements on the ground that the length of the required notice period was too long. See, e.g.,City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 606-07 [*59] (striking down a thirty-day advance notice requirement for events in parks, on streets, or in other public areas); City of Gary, 334 F.3d at 682-83 (striking down a forty-five-day advance notice requirement for demonstrations on city streets or public property); Douglas, 88 F.3d at 1523-24 (striking down a five-day advance notice requirement for processions of ten or more persons on streets, sidewalks, and public ways on the grounds that it was unjustifiably long and applied to groups as small as ten); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1356-57 (striking down a twenty-day advance notice requirement for parades).

    Conversely, ordinances requiring fewer than three days advance notice of large expressive events have survived challenge. See, e.g.,A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 170 U.S. App. D.C. 124, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (approving a two-day advance notice requirement for planned public gatherings on a designated area on the grounds of the White House); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding a two-day advance notice requirement); Local 32B-32J v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 3 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [*60] (upholding a thirty-six-hour advance notice requirement for expressive activity in the World Trade Center and Port Authority Bus Terminal).

    Food Not Bombs offers two cases in support of its argument that the two-day advance application requirement is not narrowly tailored. Both cases - one from our circuit and one from the Seventh Circuit - involved substantially longer notice requirements than the requirements imposed by the Events Ordinance.

    In City of Richmond, we held that a twenty-day advance notice requirement was not the "least restrictive means" for protecting the city's asserted interests. 743 F.2d at 1357. n19 In so holding, however, we reviewed ordinances from other cities with significantly shorter advance notice requirements, suggesting that an ordinance with an advance notice requirement that was quite short could pass muster.See id. at 1356-57 (citing twenty-four-hour, thirty-six-hour, two-day, and three-day provisions). n20

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -19

    In Ward, decided after City of Richmond, the Supreme Court rejected the use of the least restrictive means analysis and reaffirmed that "the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). [*61] 20

    At oral argument, counsel indicated that City of Richmond had served as the guidepost for the City's two-day advance notice provision.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    In City of Gary,our sister circuit struck down a forty-five-day advance permit application requirement that applied to parades, rallies, or demonstrations of groups as small as fifty. 334 F.3d at 682-83. The court noted the "reasonableness in general of requiring that a permit to hold a demonstration on city streets be sought in advance of events" but found that the challenged ordinance suffered from two detectable infirmities: (1) it failed to incorporate the notion that the smaller the planned demonstration, the less time a city would need to process a permit application, and (2) it provided no exception for spontaneous demonstrations. Id. at 682.

    These two cases, while disapproving of long advance notice provisions, do not lead us to question Santa Monica's two-day requirement. The two-day period (seventy-two-hour period, if an applicant needs a permit from the Fire or Building and Safety Departments) accords with [*62] Santa Monica's significant governmental interests by (1) providing a coordinated process for managing community events in heavily burdened and limited public space, and (2) ensuring that qualifying events, which often require the provision of public services, do not impede traffic on sidewalks and busy streets without the benefit of advance notice to the City. It does take some time to coordinate the various demands on the streets, sidewalks, and parks; assess what services (such as additional police) are needed; contact those services; ensure their availability; and allow those services to prepare for the events. Santa Monica's requirement, while not the shortest possible, is nearly so. Given that a two-day advance permit requirement accords with the few advance permitting ordinances previously cited with approval by federal courts; that it includes an exemption for spontaneous events, discussed below; and that, on the present record, the notice requirements have not in practice constricted substantial amounts of spontaneous expression, we hold that the two-day notice, on its face, is sufficiently narrowly tailored.

    (2) Ample Alternatives

    We now consider whether the permitting [*63] provisions preserve ample alternative means for communicating protected expression. As we recently stated, "[i]n the 'ample alternatives' context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment requires only that the government refrain from denying a 'reasonable opportunity' for communication." Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141 (2005) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986)); see Edwards v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2001) ("If an ordinance effectively prevents a speaker from reaching his intended audience, it fails to leave open ample alternative means of communication."); Galvin, 374 F.3d at 755-56 (noting that the ample alternatives prong can also require an opportunity to speak at a location connected to the message conveyed).

    Santa Monica's spontaneous events exception provides that "[s]pontaneous events which are occasioned by news or affairs coming into public knowledge less than forty-eight hours prior to such event may be conducted on the lawn of City Hall without the organizers first having to obtain [*64] a Community Event Permit." SMMC § 4.68.040(g). Practically speaking, this exception is necessary only for groups that would otherwise require a permit - that is, events falling under section 4.68.040(a) that do not or cannot avail themselves of the Instruction's safe harbor, or events falling under section 4.68.040(b) because they take place in parks or public spaces and involve more than 150 people.

    Echoing the statement that "[public] protests frequently occur in response to topical events, and [as such] their effectiveness may depend on both their immediacy and the forum where they take place,"City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1350, Food Not Bombs stakes out the position that the Events Ordinance fails to preserve ample alternative means of communication because the exception for spontaneous events (1) hinges on how recently a matter entered in to public knowledge and (2) forecloses affected groups from choosing the location of their spontaneous expression. n21

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -21

    Food Not Bombs also advances similar arguments in support of its contention that the spontaneous events clause is not narrowly tailored. Because the arguments are duplicative, we address them all in this section.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    [*65] The spontaneous expression exception expands the amount of free expression otherwise allowed in public fora under the Events Ordinance. It makes little sense, therefore, to consider whether the exception itself is sufficiently narrowly tailored to the asserted governmental interests. Instead, what we must consider is whether the Events Ordinance advance notice requirement, including the spontaneous expression exception, overall provides adequate alternatives for expression, both planned and spontaneous.

    The strong interest in protecting the opportunity for spontaneous expression in public fora with respect to individuals or small groups has been emphasized by prior cases. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002) ("It is offensive - not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society - that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so."); Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206-07 (noting the importance of preserving [*66] the ability of small groups to engage in spontaneous expression). Less conclusively decided is the question whether this First Amendment interest in spontaneous expression is similarly strong with respect to large groups or mass conduct. See Bayless, 320 F.3d at 1007-14 (striking down a twenty-four-hour advance notice requirement, applicable to political action campaigns, as an impermissible burden on protected speech); Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1247-48 (striking down an advance notice requirement because it reached the conduct of small groups and individuals). n22

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -22

    Bayless, which concerned a prior restraint directed at political speech, applied strict scrutiny. The concerns voiced in that opinion, nevertheless, are relevant here.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    Advance notice or permitting requirements do, by their very nature, foreclose spontaneous expression. See Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206 (recognizing that "because of the delay caused by complying with the permitting procedures, [i]mmediate [*67] speech can no longer respond to immediate issues" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1355 ("[T]he delay inherent in advance notice requirements inhibits speech. By requiring advance notice, the government outlaws spontaneous expression."); Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249. Consequently, in any particular forum, true spontaneous expression and the application of an advance notice requirement are mutually exclusive. Groups may be able to engage in expressive conduct after the notice period has expired, but the change in timing will alter the potential impact of their speech. For speech that is truly time sensitive, the precise spontaneous moment will be lost.

    Bayless provides an example of this concern. As we noted in that case:

    Restricting spontaneous political expression places a severe burden on political speech because, as the Supreme Court has observed, "timing is of the essence in politics . . . and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all." To suggest that the [twenty-four hour] waiting period is minimal ignores [*68] the reality of breakneck political campaigning and the importance of getting the message out in a timely, or, in some cases, even instantaneous fashion.

    Bayless, 320 F.3d at 1008 (citations omitted) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163, 89 S. Ct. 935, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1356 ("A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate more emotion, than the 'same' parade 20 days later."). In an era in which peaceful gatherings of large groups in public spaces to protest breaking events have resulted in rerun elections, as in the Ukraine, the importance of allowing such spontaneous public demonstrations cannot be underestimated. We conclude that to comport with the First Amendment, a permitting ordinance must provide some alternative for expression concerning fast-breaking events.

    Food Not Bombs argues that limiting the spontaneous expression exemption to events coming into the public knowledge within the past forty-eight hours makes the ordinance unconstitutionally [*69] burdensome of speech. Were we to decide that the "spontaneous" event could be based on older news, however, the exception would swallow the rule, and event organizers could simply avoid applying for a permit. The whole purpose of the spontaneous expression exemption is to accommodate speech when groups would otherwise be unable timely to seek a permit. Santa Monica's exemption serves precisely this purpose. n23

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -23

    Appellants argue that "[i]f a group [] learned early Friday that the newly-elected governor was going to be appearing at an event in Santa Monica on Sunday afternoon, they would not come within the 'spontaneous' speech limits if they organize[d] a protest for any time after 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, even if they hold it on City lawn." Pursuant to the Instruction, permits for Category 3 events can be obtained from the Community Events Office during business hours and if that office is closed, from the Police Department between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Instruction at 11 (Section IV(1)(c)(1)), 44 (Section IX(11)(d)), & 50 (Section X). The timing of appellants' hypothetical event would thus allow for the group to obtain a permit.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    [*70] We conclude that where a city has erected a very brief advance notice requirement and where that requirement is otherwise limited and properly tailored in its application, a spontaneous expression exemption that accommodates time-sensitive expression does not, without more, offend the First Amendment.

    Food Not Bombs' second basis of attack maintains that the exemption is inadequate because it opens only the City Hall lawn to spontaneous expression. The problem, Food Not Bombs asserts, is that groups that wish to tie their expression to a particular locale may not do so if they are availing themselves of the spontaneous expression exemption.

    The ability to communicate a particular message in a particular location can significantly contribute to the effectiveness of that communication. See Galvin, 374 F.3d at 750 ("The Court has recognized that location of speech, like other aspects of presentation, can affect the meaning of communication and merit First Amendment protection for that reason."); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1350 (noting that "[certain] protests frequently occur in response to topical events, and their effectiveness may depend on [*71] both their immediacy and the forum where they take place"). In Galvin, the court identified a number of ways in which speech or expression might be tied to a particular location: (1) a location may be symbolic of the very object of the protest; (2) a location may be "one where many people habitually gather, providing an inexpensive way for individuals with a message to communicate to reach a general audience composed of a cross-section of their community"; (3) a location may be "one at which the particular audience the speaker seeks to reach is present"; or (4) a location itself may be significant to the content of the message. Galvin, 374 F.3d at 747-50.

    The protection of location-specific speech, while broad, is not, however, without boundaries. "[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired."Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981); see Galvin, 374 F.3d at 751 ("As speakers may generally control the presentation of their message by choosing a location for its importance to [*72] the meaning of their speech, they may ordinarily -absent a valid time, place, and manner restriction - do so in a public forum." (emphasis added)).

    The question, then, is not whether some limitation of the ability of groups to engage in spontaneous expression at some locations in Santa Monica is valid, but whether the particular exception the City has crafted goes far enough in permitting outlets for expression when the usual two-day application deadline cannot be met. Food Not Bombs cites Galvin for support of the proposition that it does not.

    In Galvin, the United States Park Service Police declined to issue a permit to an advocacy group, Religious Witness with Homeless People, that applied for one in order to conduct a protest at the San Francisco Presidio National Park. See 374 F.3d at 742. At the protest, held without a permit, the police forced most of the protesters into alternate "First Amendment" areas 150 to 175 yards away from the specific building the protesters had chosen as their protest location. Id. at 743. We concluded that the particular restrictions the park police sought to place on where a protest might [*73] occur violated the First Amendment. As framed by Galvin, a regulation fails to leave open ample alternative means of communication when "[it] prevents the speakers from expressing their views, where that expression depends in whole or part on the chosen location." Id. at 756 (emphasis added).

    For four reasons, the Events Ordinance does not preclude appellants from effectively expressing place-dependent views:

    First, insofar as the speech is not time-sensitive, even large groups can engage in speech in any public forum location in the City if they comply with the advance notice/permitting requirements.

    Second, with respect to time-sensitive speech, large groups have the opportunity to speak on the City Hall lawn, an area abutting the primary symbol of governmental power and authority in Santa Monica. That location is likely in most instances to satisfy the locational interests of those speakers who wish to discuss public affairs in the City.

    Third, the safe harbor provision applicable to sidewalks and park paths will nearly always satisfy any remaining location-specific interest connected to spontaneous expression. Groups as large as 500 are permitted [*74] to protest without a permit so long as they abide by the less-than-fifty, two-abreast formation. By so doing, they can fully communicate their thoughts to an audience gathered in a particular location, such as a hotel or office building, in which a newsworthy event is taking place. Also, by so doing they can incorporate any location abutting a city sidewalk as part of their message. Even groups as large as 1,999 can partake of this safe harbor as long as they gather initially in a location in which they do not need a permit, including - as we understand the Events Ordinance and Instruction, read together - the City Hall lawn.

    Fourth, unorganized gatherings do not fall under the purview of the Events Ordinance. The Events Ordinance, as exemplified in the Instruction's permit application procedure, presumes the existence of an event organizer. See Instruction at 10-13 (Section IV(1)-(3)). Thus, if a news event or affair motivates an individual to express his or her views in public, the individual is under no obligation to obtain a permit.

    Given these various outlets for location-specific speech, we conclude that the Events Ordinance, taken as a whole and in light of the Instruction, [*75] provides ample alternatives for speech.
    • ^
    • v
    A similar e-mail was sent to ljohnso@bart.gov.
    • ^
    • v
    I think bart should be glad people are doing something to make their shitty station a little bit less lame and stupid.

    I mean geez, its not like the smelly bums who shout about satan or the bad singer with his crappy guitar need permits to pollute the air, why have some bureaucrat shove more stupid rules up law abiding people's butts?

    Memo to BART: Not everyone likes bullshit shoved up their asses by government agents. So take a memo, and suck it, and read the fucking constitution while you're at it, that is if you CAN read during your 10 coffee breaks and 50 weeks of paid vacation you lazy bums!
    • ^
    • v
    Here's a link to the full text of Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006) ,
    referred to above: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0356...
    • ^
    • v
    They may be able to get away with more if BART stations aren't technically considered public spaces. I don't really know, but malls and plazzas and other frighteningly named "public-private spaces" can get away with lots of awful restrictions by not really being public. Whatever that means. On the other hand, I fully support alternative use of commonly used spaces because testing those boundaries keeps them honest with the rules and makes all of our lives a little more fun.

    People don't take the Bill of Rights too seriously: I think even Upton Sinclair was once arrested for reading the 1st amendment in public.
    • ^
    • v