SFShenanigans Host Christmas in August on BART

The fact that there’s such a thing as a “Free Speech Permit” pretty much bluescreens my brain.

Reply

Bluescreen indeed.

I read the pdf documents on the bart website about paid areas and how they’re not to be used to “engage in other expressive activities.” I understand the general idea (about BART as a transport system first and foremost) but I cannot disagree enough with the implementation.

How is this free speech permit unchallenged? What is the basis in law for such a rule? Why does a government sponsored transit system somehow attain special status?

Why would the Bill of Rights not apply on the BART?

Reply

I *think* I can wrap my head around what they’re trying to do with these permits… I can imagine two rival political factions demonstrating and clashing, to the detriment of those folks who are just trying to get home from work.

Holding organizers accountable for their group’s actions seems reasonable enough until you stop to think about it.

Talking specifics, there are bits about the permit process that seem fundamentally unsuited to this sort of activity, which if you think about it translate directly to any real, fundamental free speech exercise. It’s considered a violation if you do not accurately report the number of participants in your event. In specific, this is bad because such a novelty as Christmas in August is the sort of thing you just can’t predict.

Sure, if you had professional organizers who had demographics and projections and sliding scales and membership rosters, you might have good data. You would know who’s coming, how many people you could effectively reach and all that good stuff that the nice people at BART ask for. Then again, that sounds more like canned speech than free speech. Pre-programmed and formulated before it’s even uttered.

Now, if you had a compelling message, the speech was flowing freely, and the discussion and membership of the group was free and spontaneous, you’re not going to fit the requirements of this rule. Maybe the one or two guys who came up with an idea over a couple of bottles of port one night were on to something and 10,000 people decide to abandon their trek home from their boring job and participate in a bit of frivolity and silliness. Maybe the organizers should have put down the bottle and gone for a little fresh air.

I’m all for the demographic peddlers having their free speech too. I’m even hip on those who might want to limit the effects of their skilled mongering on the crowds around me as I make the trip to my destination. Isn’t there a better way to do that, though, than to limit what’s free and unconstrained?

Reply

The BART rules and application do not define prohibited “expressive activity,” but in one instance a few examples are given, and nothing comes close to caroling.

Someone needs to challenge these things in court or the government will just take more and more rights.

Reply

Greetings kmcdani@BART.gov:

I read the comment allegedly posted by Mr. Linton Johnson, BART’s Chief Spokesperson @
http://laughingsquid.com/sfshenanigans-host-Christmas-in-august-on-bart, which states:

==================
Hi Scott,
I just wanted to first say that I enjoy your blog on laughingsquid.com. I noticed that on Sunday, you’re encouraging folks to go to the Powell Street BART Station to take part in a Christmas in August event this Sunday at 2:30pm. Sounds fun!
There’s one problem though and that is you could face an embarrasing run-in with the BART Police. The reason is that you don’t have a Free Speech Permit, which my department issues. The good news is you can easily get one, and they’re free. The bad news is it’s too late to get one by August 26 because you need to submit your application no less than 7 days in advance. Here’s how you get an application: http://www.bart.gov/freespeech/.
If you can change the date, then we’ll be happy to issue you a permit, just let me know how I can help. Perhaps I might even join you!
Thanks in advance.

==================

BART’s rule @ http://www.bart.gov/docs/FE_Permit_Rules.pdf to submit an application at least seven days prior to an event appears to be contrary to the U.S. Court of Appeals decision in Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court pointed out that while the federal courts have upheld various advance notice requirements, such as 36 hours advance notice for expressive conduct at a busy bus terminal, that the courts have struck down longer periods, such as five days.

Needless to say, while BART’s police may enjoy qualified immunity in enforcing the seven day notice requirement, I would suggest that the more reasonable approach would be to allow the Christmas in August event to proceed and for BART to amend its rules within constitutionally acceptable parameters.

This would also be consonant with Mr. Johnson’s well-founded desire to avoid embarrassment, especially in front of a U.S. District Court judge in a civil rights action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.

Sincerely,

David

From Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006):

b. Breadth of the Advance Notice and Permitting Requirements

(b) We next consider whether the two-day advance notice requirement applicable to Category 3 events, those events not encompassed within Categories 1 and 2, is narrowly tailored.

As noted by the Seventh Circuit:

[T]he length of the required period of advance notice is critical to its reasonableness; and given that the time required to consider an application will generally be shorter the smaller the planned demonstration and that political demonstrations are often engendered by topical events, a very long period of advance notice with no exception for spontaneous demonstrations unreasonably limits free speech.

Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2003). Courts, including ours, have struck down a variety of advance notice requirements on the ground that the length of the required notice period was too long. See, e.g.,City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 606-07 [*59] (striking down a thirty-day advance notice requirement for events in parks, on streets, or in other public areas); City of Gary, 334 F.3d at 682-83 (striking down a forty-five-day advance notice requirement for demonstrations on city streets or public property); Douglas, 88 F.3d at 1523-24 (striking down a five-day advance notice requirement for processions of ten or more persons on streets, sidewalks, and public ways on the grounds that it was unjustifiably long and applied to groups as small as ten); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1356-57 (striking down a twenty-day advance notice requirement for parades).

Conversely, ordinances requiring fewer than three days advance notice of large expressive events have survived challenge. See, e.g.,A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 170 U.S. App. D.C. 124, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (approving a two-day advance notice requirement for planned public gatherings on a designated area on the grounds of the White House); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding a two-day advance notice requirement); Local 32B-32J v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 3 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [*60] (upholding a thirty-six-hour advance notice requirement for expressive activity in the World Trade Center and Port Authority Bus Terminal).

Food Not Bombs offers two cases in support of its argument that the two-day advance application requirement is not narrowly tailored. Both cases – one from our circuit and one from the Seventh Circuit – involved substantially longer notice requirements than the requirements imposed by the Events Ordinance.

In City of Richmond, we held that a twenty-day advance notice requirement was not the “least restrictive means” for protecting the city’s asserted interests. 743 F.2d at 1357. n19 In so holding, however, we reviewed ordinances from other cities with significantly shorter advance notice requirements, suggesting that an ordinance with an advance notice requirement that was quite short could pass muster.See id. at 1356-57 (citing twenty-four-hour, thirty-six-hour, two-day, and three-day provisions). n20

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -19

In Ward, decided after City of Richmond, the Supreme Court rejected the use of the least restrictive means analysis and reaffirmed that “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). [*61] 20

At oral argument, counsel indicated that City of Richmond had served as the guidepost for the City’s two-day advance notice provision.
- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

In City of Gary,our sister circuit struck down a forty-five-day advance permit application requirement that applied to parades, rallies, or demonstrations of groups as small as fifty. 334 F.3d at 682-83. The court noted the “reasonableness in general of requiring that a permit to hold a demonstration on city streets be sought in advance of events” but found that the challenged ordinance suffered from two detectable infirmities: (1) it failed to incorporate the notion that the smaller the planned demonstration, the less time a city would need to process a permit application, and (2) it provided no exception for spontaneous demonstrations. Id. at 682.

These two cases, while disapproving of long advance notice provisions, do not lead us to question Santa Monica’s two-day requirement. The two-day period (seventy-two-hour period, if an applicant needs a permit from the Fire or Building and Safety Departments) accords with [*62] Santa Monica’s significant governmental interests by (1) providing a coordinated process for managing community events in heavily burdened and limited public space, and (2) ensuring that qualifying events, which often require the provision of public services, do not impede traffic on sidewalks and busy streets without the benefit of advance notice to the City. It does take some time to coordinate the various demands on the streets, sidewalks, and parks; assess what services (such as additional police) are needed; contact those services; ensure their availability; and allow those services to prepare for the events. Santa Monica’s requirement, while not the shortest possible, is nearly so. Given that a two-day advance permit requirement accords with the few advance permitting ordinances previously cited with approval by federal courts; that it includes an exemption for spontaneous events, discussed below; and that, on the present record, the notice requirements have not in practice constricted substantial amounts of spontaneous expression, we hold that the two-day notice, on its face, is sufficiently narrowly tailored.

(2) Ample Alternatives

We now consider whether the permitting [*63] provisions preserve ample alternative means for communicating protected expression. As we recently stated, “[i]n the ‘ample alternatives’ context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment requires only that the government refrain from denying a ‘reasonable opportunity’ for communication.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141 (2005) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986)); see Edwards v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2001) (”If an ordinance effectively prevents a speaker from reaching his intended audience, it fails to leave open ample alternative means of communication.”); Galvin, 374 F.3d at 755-56 (noting that the ample alternatives prong can also require an opportunity to speak at a location connected to the message conveyed).

Santa Monica’s spontaneous events exception provides that “[s]pontaneous events which are occasioned by news or affairs coming into public knowledge less than forty-eight hours prior to such event may be conducted on the lawn of City Hall without the organizers first having to obtain [*64] a Community Event Permit.” SMMC § 4.68.040(g). Practically speaking, this exception is necessary only for groups that would otherwise require a permit – that is, events falling under section 4.68.040(a) that do not or cannot avail themselves of the Instruction’s safe harbor, or events falling under section 4.68.040(b) because they take place in parks or public spaces and involve more than 150 people.

Echoing the statement that “[public] protests frequently occur in response to topical events, and [as such] their effectiveness may depend on both their immediacy and the forum where they take place,”City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1350, Food Not Bombs stakes out the position that the Events Ordinance fails to preserve ample alternative means of communication because the exception for spontaneous events (1) hinges on how recently a matter entered in to public knowledge and (2) forecloses affected groups from choosing the location of their spontaneous expression. n21

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -21

Food Not Bombs also advances similar arguments in support of its contention that the spontaneous events clause is not narrowly tailored. Because the arguments are duplicative, we address them all in this section.
- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

[*65] The spontaneous expression exception expands the amount of free expression otherwise allowed in public fora under the Events Ordinance. It makes little sense, therefore, to consider whether the exception itself is sufficiently narrowly tailored to the asserted governmental interests. Instead, what we must consider is whether the Events Ordinance advance notice requirement, including the spontaneous expression exception, overall provides adequate alternatives for expression, both planned and spontaneous.

The strong interest in protecting the opportunity for spontaneous expression in public fora with respect to individuals or small groups has been emphasized by prior cases. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002) (”It is offensive – not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society – that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.”); Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206-07 (noting the importance of preserving [*66] the ability of small groups to engage in spontaneous expression). Less conclusively decided is the question whether this First Amendment interest in spontaneous expression is similarly strong with respect to large groups or mass conduct. See Bayless, 320 F.3d at 1007-14 (striking down a twenty-four-hour advance notice requirement, applicable to political action campaigns, as an impermissible burden on protected speech); Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1247-48 (striking down an advance notice requirement because it reached the conduct of small groups and individuals). n22

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -22

Bayless, which concerned a prior restraint directed at political speech, applied strict scrutiny. The concerns voiced in that opinion, nevertheless, are relevant here.
- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

Advance notice or permitting requirements do, by their very nature, foreclose spontaneous expression. See Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206 (recognizing that “because of the delay caused by complying with the permitting procedures, [i]mmediate [*67] speech can no longer respond to immediate issues” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1355 (”[T]he delay inherent in advance notice requirements inhibits speech. By requiring advance notice, the government outlaws spontaneous expression.”); Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249. Consequently, in any particular forum, true spontaneous expression and the application of an advance notice requirement are mutually exclusive. Groups may be able to engage in expressive conduct after the notice period has expired, but the change in timing will alter the potential impact of their speech. For speech that is truly time sensitive, the precise spontaneous moment will be lost.

Bayless provides an example of this concern. As we noted in that case:

Restricting spontaneous political expression places a severe burden on political speech because, as the Supreme Court has observed, “timing is of the essence in politics . . . and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one’s voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all.” To suggest that the [twenty-four hour] waiting period is minimal ignores [*68] the reality of breakneck political campaigning and the importance of getting the message out in a timely, or, in some cases, even instantaneous fashion.

Bayless, 320 F.3d at 1008 (citations omitted) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163, 89 S. Ct. 935, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1356 (”A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate more emotion, than the ’same’ parade 20 days later.”). In an era in which peaceful gatherings of large groups in public spaces to protest breaking events have resulted in rerun elections, as in the Ukraine, the importance of allowing such spontaneous public demonstrations cannot be underestimated. We conclude that to comport with the First Amendment, a permitting ordinance must provide some alternative for expression concerning fast-breaking events.

Food Not Bombs argues that limiting the spontaneous expression exemption to events coming into the public knowledge within the past forty-eight hours makes the ordinance unconstitutionally [*69] burdensome of speech. Were we to decide that the “spontaneous” event could be based on older news, however, the exception would swallow the rule, and event organizers could simply avoid applying for a permit. The whole purpose of the spontaneous expression exemption is to accommodate speech when groups would otherwise be unable timely to seek a permit. Santa Monica’s exemption serves precisely this purpose. n23

- – - – - – - – - – - – - – Footnotes – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -23

Appellants argue that “[i]f a group [] learned early Friday that the newly-elected governor was going to be appearing at an event in Santa Monica on Sunday afternoon, they would not come within the ’spontaneous’ speech limits if they organize[d] a protest for any time after 9:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, even if they hold it on City lawn.” Pursuant to the Instruction, permits for Category 3 events can be obtained from the Community Events Office during business hours and if that office is closed, from the Police Department between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Instruction at 11 (Section IV(1)(c)(1)), 44 (Section IX(11)(d)), & 50 (Section X). The timing of appellants’ hypothetical event would thus allow for the group to obtain a permit.
- – - – - – - – - – - – End Footnotes- – - – - – - – - – - – - -

[*70] We conclude that where a city has erected a very brief advance notice requirement and where that requirement is otherwise limited and properly tailored in its application, a spontaneous expression exemption that accommodates time-sensitive expression does not, without more, offend the First Amendment.

Food Not Bombs’ second basis of attack maintains that the exemption is inadequate because it opens only the City Hall lawn to spontaneous expression. The problem, Food Not Bombs asserts, is that groups that wish to tie their expression to a particular locale may not do so if they are availing themselves of the spontaneous expression exemption.

The ability to communicate a particular message in a particular location can significantly contribute to the effectiveness of that communication. See Galvin, 374 F.3d at 750 (”The Court has recognized that location of speech, like other aspects of presentation, can affect the meaning of communication and merit First Amendment protection for that reason.”); City of Richmond, 743 F.2d at 1350 (noting that “[certain] protests frequently occur in response to topical events, and their effectiveness may depend on [*71] both their immediacy and the forum where they take place”). In Galvin, the court identified a number of ways in which speech or expression might be tied to a particular location: (1) a location may be symbolic of the very object of the protest; (2) a location may be “one where many people habitually gather, providing an inexpensive way for individuals with a message to communicate to reach a general audience composed of a cross-section of their community”; (3) a location may be “one at which the particular audience the speaker seeks to reach is present”; or (4) a location itself may be significant to the content of the message. Galvin, 374 F.3d at 747-50.

The protection of location-specific speech, while broad, is not, however, without boundaries. “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981); see Galvin, 374 F.3d at 751 (”As speakers may generally control the presentation of their message by choosing a location for its importance to [*72] the meaning of their speech, they may ordinarily -absent a valid time, place, and manner restriction – do so in a public forum.” (emphasis added)).

The question, then, is not whether some limitation of the ability of groups to engage in spontaneous expression at some locations in Santa Monica is valid, but whether the particular exception the City has crafted goes far enough in permitting outlets for expression when the usual two-day application deadline cannot be met. Food Not Bombs cites Galvin for support of the proposition that it does not.

In Galvin, the United States Park Service Police declined to issue a permit to an advocacy group, Religious Witness with Homeless People, that applied for one in order to conduct a protest at the San Francisco Presidio National Park. See 374 F.3d at 742. At the protest, held without a permit, the police forced most of the protesters into alternate “First Amendment” areas 150 to 175 yards away from the specific building the protesters had chosen as their protest location. Id. at 743. We concluded that the particular restrictions the park police sought to place on where a protest might [*73] occur violated the First Amendment. As framed by Galvin, a regulation fails to leave open ample alternative means of communication when “[it] prevents the speakers from expressing their views, where that expression depends in whole or part on the chosen location.” Id. at 756 (emphasis added).

For four reasons, the Events Ordinance does not preclude appellants from effectively expressing place-dependent views:

First, insofar as the speech is not time-sensitive, even large groups can engage in speech in any public forum location in the City if they comply with the advance notice/permitting requirements.

Second, with respect to time-sensitive speech, large groups have the opportunity to speak on the City Hall lawn, an area abutting the primary symbol of governmental power and authority in Santa Monica. That location is likely in most instances to satisfy the locational interests of those speakers who wish to discuss public affairs in the City.

Third, the safe harbor provision applicable to sidewalks and park paths will nearly always satisfy any remaining location-specific interest connected to spontaneous expression. Groups as large as 500 are permitted [*74] to protest without a permit so long as they abide by the less-than-fifty, two-abreast formation. By so doing, they can fully communicate their thoughts to an audience gathered in a particular location, such as a hotel or office building, in which a newsworthy event is taking place. Also, by so doing they can incorporate any location abutting a city sidewalk as part of their message. Even groups as large as 1,999 can partake of this safe harbor as long as they gather initially in a location in which they do not need a permit, including – as we understand the Events Ordinance and Instruction, read together – the City Hall lawn.

Fourth, unorganized gatherings do not fall under the purview of the Events Ordinance. The Events Ordinance, as exemplified in the Instruction’s permit application procedure, presumes the existence of an event organizer. See Instruction at 10-13 (Section IV(1)-(3)). Thus, if a news event or affair motivates an individual to express his or her views in public, the individual is under no obligation to obtain a permit.

Given these various outlets for location-specific speech, we conclude that the Events Ordinance, taken as a whole and in light of the Instruction, [*75] provides ample alternatives for speech.

Reply

I think bart should be glad people are doing something to make their shitty station a little bit less lame and stupid.

I mean geez, its not like the smelly bums who shout about satan or the bad singer with his crappy guitar need permits to pollute the air, why have some bureaucrat shove more stupid rules up law abiding people’s butts?

Memo to BART: Not everyone likes bullshit shoved up their asses by government agents. So take a memo, and suck it, and read the fucking constitution while you’re at it, that is if you CAN read during your 10 coffee breaks and 50 weeks of paid vacation you lazy bums!

Reply

They may be able to get away with more if BART stations aren’t technically considered public spaces. I don’t really know, but malls and plazzas and other frighteningly named “public-private spaces” can get away with lots of awful restrictions by not really being public. Whatever that means. On the other hand, I fully support alternative use of commonly used spaces because testing those boundaries keeps them honest with the rules and makes all of our lives a little more fun.

People don’t take the Bill of Rights too seriously: I think even Upton Sinclair was once arrested for reading the 1st amendment in public.

Reply

I’ll be honest,

Mr Johnson makes a pretty fair point: Free Speech shouldn’t be squashed ever, but public safety is kinda important as well….

Reply

To paraphrase Ben Franklin, anyone who sacrifices free speech for public safety does not deserve either.

Reply

while I understand the need to balance “free speech” with “public safety” I have to say this..
When the government [or agency there of] asserts the right to control the where, when, and how of your speech you no longer have “Free Speech”

Reply

Yes, i have to go with Ben Franklin on this one. Freedom can never be sacrificed in the name of safety, no matter what. The court’s ruling must be overturned, and demonstration groups must be allowed to interfere with ‘business as usual’ in all aspects of life. There is already a natural limit to how much damage can be done, because the more ‘wacko’ your speech, the fewer people will be involved. And, it is already illegal to do something violent or that compromises safety, so these people can be arrested if they break the law. But you can’t PREVENT them from congregating, you can only arrest them after they ACTUALLY BREAK a law. To put it another way, pre-emptive measures are evil, unconstitutional, and very very un-american.

Reply

Personally, I agree, if the US platforms are anything like the London tube. A flashmob on a London platform is a deadly thing – people get pushed off, fall in front of trains, fall on the live line, die.

I’m really impressed both by their willingness to work with you on this, and by their awareness that “free flow” == “public safety”.

In the UK we have had some cases where “free flow” disappeared, and people die. Nonfatal tube station crushes happen fairly often, so often it’s unremarkable, and actually hard to find accounts: http://www.lynnefeatherstone.org/column6.htm

They have a system in place at London Bridge station where they would stop people going through the gates once the platforms got full to a certain level: a great idea, but not implemented at all stations.

But it’s not just the UK: it’s worldwide. Managers would ne negligent if they allowed unmanaged crowds to gather and endanger the people they are meant to be caring for.

1964 Lima: 300 die in a stampede after goal disallowed, Olympic qualifying match.
1968 Buenos Aires: 74 die when a crowd stampeded after burning paper was thrown on to football terraces. Fans head towards a closed exit and are crushed against the doors.
1971 Glasgow: 66 die when barriers in Ibrox stadium collapse during football match.
1974 Cairo: 49 trampled to death as crowds break barriers.
1979 Lagos: 24 die as Nigerian football fans stampede during a light failure.
1981 Piraeus: 24 die in a stampede as Greek fans rush to leave sports ground.
1981 Sheffield: 38 injured during a crowd surge at Hillsborough stadium.
1982 Moscow: 340 die at European Cup match when fans, leaving stadium, try to re-enter after last-minute goal.
1982 Cali, Columbia: 24 die when drunken sports fans provoke a stadium stampede.
1985 Mexico City: 10 die trying to force their way into a stadium.
1985 Brussels: 39 die at Heysel stadium when riots break out and a wall collapses.
1988 Kathmandu: 70 die in stampede towards locked sports-stadium exits in a hailstorm.
1989 Sheffield: 95 die, over 400 injured, in crowd surge when police open gates at Hillsborough football stadium to alleviate crowding.
1990 Mecca: 1,426 die in stampede in overcrowded pedestrian tunnel during the annual Haj pilgrimage.
1991 Orkney, South Africa: 40 die along fences when cricket fans try to escape fighting.
1993 Hong Kong: 21 die in crowd crush when thousands of new years’ party-goers were caught off-guard in narrow sloping streets in the Lan Kwai Fong disaster; poor police planning and bad weather played a part.
1994 Mecca: 270 pilgrims die in a stampede during “stoning the devil” ritual.
1996 Guatemala City: 83 die at a World Cup qualifying match.
1998 Mecca: 150 Muslim pilgrims crushed to death in a stampede.
1999 Kerala state, south India: 51 killed in a stampede after part of a shrine collapsed during Hindu ceremony attended by 1.5m.
1999 Minsk, Belarus: 53 die when a crowd of 2,500 rushed to get out of the rain at the railway station.

It’s not a new problem, either: the 1943 crush at Bethnal Green Underground Station (173 dead, 69 of whom were children) was the biggest death toll ever on the UK underground, including the 7/7 terrorist bombs and all tube crashes ever.

This is why, in disasters, the authorities avoid “causing panic” and ask that people “stay calm”. More people can die from the panic than the disaster.

So, flash crowds clearly kill. Do not fuck with crowds in small areas when you don’t know what you’re doing. If you’re going to have an internet-arranged event with an unknown number of people turning up, arrange it with the site owners, because they will know a hell of a lot more about the crowd dynamics there than you do.

Reply

I really, really want to comment on this, but the whole thing is so frighteningly brainless I am struck dumb.

It is a group of people singing Christmas Carols. Not it’ll probably be quite a bit larger due to this and other discussions, but I really doubt it’ll get bigger than even 50 people (I’m thinking more like 25) and if that happened I’m sure it’d break up into smaller groups (more groups = more trains = more chances to spread the Christmas cheer).

This should not, and I believe does not require a permit of any kind, and the whole idea of calling something a “free speech permit” is a double-plus ungood example of the worst kind of doublespeak. The speech is free, or it isn’t. Requiring a safety permit for large groups is one thing, requiring one for any group or individual who wishes to exercise free speech is another.

I guess I said something after all.

Reply

It’s actually a little frightening that we have a presumably well-paid spokesman and “Free Speech Permit” administrator with a journalism degree who thinks “embarrasing” and “superceeds” and “agencie” and “congragate” are the correct way to spell those words.

This is the same authoritarian transportation agency that thought it would be a good idea to bring in pot-sniffing dogs onto the trains just to make sure everyone was on the straight and narrow. Safety, my ass.

Reply

You’re right, I should’ve double checked my spelling. How embarrasing.

Reply

Bureaucracy anyone?
Just don’t forget to get your Form 27b/6 notarized, in triplicate!

I’m not usually this snide, but pushing it off on the board and saying “hey, I don’t give the orders, I just follow them” just feels a little insulting.

If he really believes in free speech and thinks we’re right, he’d listen and help, perhaps even going to the board himself (since he’s way closer to them and as a high ranking BART employee would have their ears).

Instead he hides behind the rules, behind the bureaucratic structure and pushes the whole thing back. Depressing that it is so typical.

Reply

BART Director Zoyd Luce: “BART has allowed itself to become a bureaucracy and a ‘bureaucracy is,’ according to James Clavell, ‘a place where good ideas go to die.’ Both professionally and as a BART Board member, I want BART to be an organization where good ideas are born, nurtured and mature. This can only come about in an organization where trust transcends every action. This is the kind of organization I will promote at BART.”

http://www.bart.gov/textOnly/about/bod/bodMembersDetail_316.asp

Reply